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ABSTRACT 
 
Does the EU have a compliance problem? This paper argues that we have 
simply no evidence that the European Union suffers from a serious compliance 
deficit which is claimed by the European Commission and academics alike. 
First, there are no data that measure the actual level of non-compliance in the 
EU-member states. Second, the statistics published by the European 
Commission, which allow to compare non-compliance between the different 
member states, are often not properly interpreted. If we control for changes in 
the Commission’s enforcement strategy, on the one hand, and the rising number 
of legislation to be complied with as well as of member states that have to 
comply, on the other hand, the level of non-compliance in the EU has not 
significantly decreased over time. Moreover, non-compliance varies 
significantly and is focused on four particular member states that account for up 
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Does the EU have a compliance problem? The European Commission as well as 
the academic literature have denounced a growing compliance deficit, which is 
believed to be systemic or pathological to the EU (Krislov, Ehlermann and 
Weiler 1986; Weiler 1988; Snyder 1993; Mendrinou 1996; Tallberg 1999). 
European policy-makers and academic scholars alike base their assessments on 
statistics published in the Annual Reports on Monitoring the Application of 
Community Law. According to these data, the Commission has opened more 
than some 15.700 infringement proceedings against the member states since 
1978. In recent years, it received an annual average of 1.000 complaints from 
citizens, companies, and non-governmental organizations about violations of 
Community Law. And the European Court of Justice has been asked to rule on 
about 80 infringement cases each year for the last decade. These figures are 
impressive and indeed might suggest that the EU suffers from serious 
compliance problems.  
 
By contrast, this paper argues that we have little evidence that member 
state non-compliance with Community Law is a systemic or pathological 
problem. If put into proper context, existing data indicate that the level of non-
compliance is rather modest and has remained stable over time. The allegedly 
growing compliance deficit in the EU does not so much reflect a lacking 
willingness or capacity of the member states to obey European Law but are 
mainly the product of statistical artifacts. In order to develop this argument, the 
paper proceeds in two steps. It starts with raising some critical questions about 
the data used as evidence for systemic non-compliance with Community Law. I 
argue that the statistics published by the Commission are no indicator for the 
actual level of non-compliance. Nor can we simply use them as measures of 
relative non-compliance for changes across time, member states, or policy 
sectors because the data are not always complete and sometimes inconsistent. 
The second part of the paper revisits the empirical evidence on the compliance 
deficit of the EU. I demonstrate that, if measured against a constantly growing 
body of legislation in force and an expanding number of member states, the 
level of non-compliance is modest and has remained stable, or even declined. 
This is particularly true, if we additionally control for political factors, such as 
changes in the enforcement strategy of the Commission. Finally, non-com-
pliance varies significantly and is focused on only four particular member states 
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that account for up to two-thirds of all infringements. The paper concludes with 
a plea for more systematic research on the sources of member state non-
compliance with Community Law. 
 
 
ASSESSING MEMBER STATE COMPLIANCE WITH COMMUNITY 
LAW 
 
EU Infringement Proceedings as a Proxy for Non-Compliance 
 
The only comprehensive data on member state non-compliance with 
Community Law is provided by the Annual Reports of the Commission on the 
Monitoring of the Application of Community Law. Since 1984, the Commission 
reports each year on the actions it took against violations of European 
legislation.  
 
Article 226 EC grants the European Commission the right to initiate 
infringement proceedings against member states that have failed to fulfil a 
Treaty obligation. There are five types of infringements, which can occur in the 
implementation of Community Law and against which the Commission may 
take action (see figure 1): 
 
1)  Violations of Treaty Provisions, Regulations, and Decisions 
(“violation”) 
Treaty Provisions, Regulations, and Decisions are directly applicable and, 
therefore, do not have to be incorporated into national law.
1 Non-
compliance takes the form of not or incorrectly applying and enforcing 
European obligations as well as of taking, or not repealing, violative na-
tional measures.  
2)  Non-transposition of Directives (“no measures notified”) 
Directives are not directly applicable, as a result of which they have to be 
incorporated into national law. Member states are left the choice as to the 
form and methods of implementation (within the doctrine of the éffet utile, 
which stipulates that the member states have to choose the most effective 
means)
2. Non-compliance manifests itself in a total failure to issue the 
required national legislation. 
3)  Incorrect legal implementation of Directives (“not properly 
incorporated”) 
The transposition of Directives may be wrongful. Non-compliance takes 
the form of either incomplete or incorrect incorporation of Directives into 
national law. Parts of the obligations of the Directive are not enacted or 
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national regulations deviate from European obligations because they are 
not amended and repealed, respectively. 
4)  Improper application of Directive (“not properly applied”) 
Even if the legal implementation of a Directive is correct and complete, it 
still may not be practically applied. Non-compliance involves the active 
violation of taking conflicting national measures or the passive failure to 
invoke the obligations of the Directive. The latter also includes failures to 
effectively enforce Community Law, that is take positive action against 
violators, both by national administration and judicial organs, as well as 
make adequate remedies available to the individual against infringements 
which impinge on her rights. 
5)  Non-compliance with ECJ judgements (“not yet complied with”) 
Once the European Court of Justice finds a member state guilty of 
infringing Community Law, the member state is finally obliged to remedy 
the issue. Non-compliance refers to the failure of member states to 





Figure 1: Infringements in the Implementation Process of Community Law 
            Directive             Regulation/Treaty Provision 
 
Legal       Transposition 
Implementation    incorporation by national law 
   delayed   “no measures notified” 
   incomplete 
   incorrect  “not properly incorporated” 
 
 
Practical    Practical  Application  and       Practical  Application  and 
Implementation   Enforcement            Enforcement 
-  incorrect  application         -  incorrect  application 
-  non-application, monitoring, enforcement - non-application, etc. 
“not  properly  applied”         “violation” 
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The proceedings specified in Art. 226 EC-Treaty (ex-Art. 169) consists of six 
subsequent stages (see figure 2).  
 
1) Suspected infringements 
Suspected infringements refer to instances in which the Commission has 
some reasons to believe that a member state violated Community Law. 
Such suspicions can be triggered by different sources:  
•  complaints lodged by citizens, corporations, and non-governmental 
organization. 
•  own initiatives of the Commission 
•  petitions and questions by the European Parliament 
•  non-communication of the transposition of Directives by the 
member states 
2) Formal Letter of Notice (Art. 226) 
The Formal Letter of the Commission delimits the subject-matter and 
invites the member state to submit its observations. Member states have 
between one and two months time to respond. Unlike their name suggests, 
Formal Letters are not part of the official proceedings. The Commission 
considers them as a preliminary stage, which serves the purpose of 
information and consultation, which afford a member state the opportunity 
to regularize its position rather than bringing it to account (Commission of 
the European Communities 1984: 4/5).
3 Consequently, Formal Letters are 
only made official, if they refer to cases where member states have not 
communicated the transposition of Directives within the given time-limit 
non-transposition and the Commission automatically opens proceedings. 
3) Reasoned Opinion (Art. 226) 
The Reasoned Opinion is the first official stage in the infringement 
proceedings. The Commission sets out the legal justification for 
commencing legal proceedings. It gives a detailed account of how it thinks 
Community Law has been infringed by a member state and states a time-
limit, within in which she expects the matter to be rectified. The member 
states have one month time to respond. 
4) Referral to the European Court of Justice (Art. 226) 
The ECJ Referral is the last means to which the Commission can resort in 
cases of persistent non-compliance. Before bringing a case before the ECJ, 
the Commission usually attempts to find some last minute solutions in 
bilateral negotiations with the member state. 
5) ECJ Judgement (Art. 226) 
The ECJ acts as the ultimate adjudicator between the Commission and the 
member states. First, it verifies whether a member states actually violated 
European law as claimed by the Commission. Second, it examines whether 
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the European legal act under consideration requires the measures demanded 
by the Commission. And finally, the Court decides whether to dismiss or 
grant the legal action of the Commission.  
6) Post-Litigation Infringement Proceedings (Art. 228) 
If member states refuse to comply with an ECJ judgement, the Commission 
may open new proceedings for post-litigation non-compliance (Article 228 
EC, ex-Article 171). Since 1996, it can ask the ECJ to impose financial 
penalties, either in form of a lump sum or a daily fine, which is calculated 
according to the scope and duration of the infringement as well as the 
capabilities of the member states.
4 
 
Figure 2: The Infringement Proceedings and Its Different Stages 
                                   Art.  228  Proceedings 
                          Financial  Penalties 
                           Art.  226 
                   Art.  226         ECJ  Ruling 
                   Art.  226     ECJ  Referral 
                   Art. 226        Reasoned Opinion 
   Formal Letter 
Suspected  Infringements             Established  Infringements 
Complaints, Commission’s 
own initiatives, petitions 
parliamentary questions 
 




The number of infringements within the different stages is usually taken as an 
indicator for member state non-compliance with Community Law. Such 
inferences are not without problems though. There are some good reasons to 
question whether infringement proceedings qualify as valid and reliable 
indicators of compliance failure. 
 
Strictly speaking, we have no data, which would allow us to draw any 
valid conclusion about whether the EU has a compliance problem. Infringement 
proceedings are no indicator of the actual or absolute level of non-compliance 
in the EU. They only cover a fraction of the violations of Community Law in the 
member states. The jurisprudence of the ECJ under the preliminary ruling 
procedure of Art. 234 (ex-Art. 177) already indicates that many cases of non-
compliance occur without getting caught by the Art. 226 procedure. 
Unfortunately, we have no means to estimate the cases of unrevealed non-
compliance. Therefore, infringement proceedings can only serve as indicators of 
relative non-compliance. They may allow us to compare the level of non-
compliance across time, policy sectors, and member states – but only if we can 
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assume that the non-compliance cases prosecuted by the EU constitute a random 
sample of all non-compliance cases that occur. There are two major reasons 
which could lead us to question the representativeness of the infringement data. 
First, the Commission is not able to systematically monitor compliance with 
Community Law. And second, the Commission may not disclose all the cases, 
in which it took action against infringements of Community Law. 
 
The Problem of Unrevealed Non-compliance 
 
Infringement proceedings only cover cases of non-compliance which have been 
detected by the Commission itself or have been brought to its attention by 
citizens, companies, or interest groups. The detection rate is rather high for the 
failure to transpose Directives into national law. Non-transposition accounts for 
more than two-thirds of all infringement cases opened. The chances of disclo-
sure significantly decrease, however, when it comes to complete and correct 
transposition, practical application and enforcement of European policies. Given 
the limited resources of the Commission, it largely depends upon member states 
reporting back on their implementation activities,
5 on costly and time-
consuming consultancy reports, or on information from domestic actors on these 
stages of the implementation process. Commission officials can do on-site visits, 
but such spot-checks tend to be time-consuming, politically fraught, and can be 
blocked by member states. They are usually not more than ‘fact-finding 
missions’ to clarify certain points rather than investigate instances of suspected 
non-compliance. Societal monitoring is therefore the most important source of 
information. It may vary significantly between member states due to different 
degrees of social mobilization and respect for law. A country whose citizens are 
collectively active and law-abiding could generate more complaints than a 
member state whose citizens show little respect for the law and are less inclined 
to engage in collective action. Yet, the distribution of complaints across member 
states shows that societal activism per se is not the issue (table 1). Population 
size seems to be more important. The five biggest member states – Germany, 
France, the UK, Italy, and Spain – are home of more than 75% of the European 
population and account for about 69% of the complaints lodged in the last 18 
years. At the same time, the numbers of complaints originating in Germany and 
the UK are lower than we would expect given their population size. Spain, by 
contrast, has an usually high share of complaints compared to the other big four. 
The same is true for Greece within the group of less populated states, which 
accounts for a much bigger share of complaints than the Netherlands or 
Denmark, for instance. Both Spain and Greece show a lower degree of societal 
activism than their northern counterparts of similar population size (Eder and 
Kousis 2001). It could be argued that southern societies hold a certain distrust 
against their state institutions as a result of which they resort to the European 
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Union for assistance (Pridham and Cini 1994). However, neither Italy nor 
Portugal really fit this explanation.  
 
Another factor, which may lead to an unequal disclosure of non-
compliance with Community Law, is linked to the availability of reliable data. 
Member states may lack the necessary administrative capacity to verify whether 
European legislation is successfully applied and complied with. Monitoring 
water and air quality, for instance, requires an adequate technical and scientific 
infrastructure. In the absence of comprehensive and reliable monitoring data, 
neither the member states nor their citizens nor the Commission are able to 
assess compliance with European air and water pollution control Directives. Yet, 
member states with high monitoring capacities, such as Denmark and the 
Netherlands, show a low number of complaints while those with weaker 
administrative and scientific infrastructures, like Greece and Spain, find 
themselves at the upper end of the list (table 1). Moreover, it has been argued in 
the literature that it is the very lack of monitoring capacity in some (southern) 
member states, which, among other factors, accounts for their high number of 
infringements (Pridham and Cini 1994; Hooghe 1993). 
 
TABLE 1:
6 M EMBER STATES COMPARED BY POPULATION AND INFRINGEMENT STAGES, 
1983-99 
  Percentage of EU 
population  
Average percentage of 
complaints* 
Average percentage of 
Formal Letters 
    Administrative (informal) phase 
Germany   21,9%    11,9%    7,8% 
France    15,7%   16,8%   10,3% 
UK    15,7%   9,9%   6,6% 
Italy    15,3%   12,9%   11,6% 
Spain    10,6%   17,6%   10,1% 
Netherlands    4,2%   3,5%   5,9% 
Greece   2,8%   10,5%   11,3% 
Belgium   2,7%   5,1%   8,4% 
Portugal   2,6%   4,5%    10,8% 
Denmark    1,4%   2,6%   4,5% 
Ireland    1,0%   3,8%   6,5% 
Luxembourg   0,1%   0,9%   6,2% 
EU     8,3%   8,3% 
Source: column 1: National Accounts, OECD, Paris, 1999; column 2, 3: Annual Reports 
on the Monitoring of the Application of Community Law 1984-99. 
* The figures for the complaints are only an approximation since the Annual Reports 
do not provide consistent data on complaints (see below) 
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In sum, there are no obvious factors which appear to bias the disclosure of non-
compliance towards certain member states. 
 
The Problem of Incomplete and Inconsistent Data 
 
The infringement data published by the Commission are both incomplete and 
not always consistent. First, the Commission has repeatedly changed the way in 
which it reports data. Suspected infringements are a case in point. From 1982 till 
1991, their numbers are indicated by two different figures, complaints and own 
investigations by the Commission. Between 1992 and 1997, the Commission 
provides only one figure, which does neither refer to complaints only nor to the 
Commission’s own investigation nor does it equal the aggregate of the two. 
Since 1998, the Commission reports three figures – complaints, own 
investigations, and non-communication of the transposition of Directives, 
whereby it remains unclear whether the third category has been newly 
introduced or was included in one of the two other categories in the past. A 
comparison of suspected infringements across time is further impaired because 
since 1995, the Commission has counted parliamentary questions and petitions 
as complaints or own investigations. Similar problems arise when it comes to 
the reporting of infringement cases by policy sectors, since they have been 
redefined several times across the years. Thus in 1992, DG III changed its name 
from “Internal Market and Industrial Affairs” to “Industry” as a result of which 
the number of complaints in this sector dropped dramatically from 382 in 1992 
to 34 in 1993. Futhermore, some data are not provided at all or only for a limited 
number of years. Transposition rates have been included in the Annual Reports 
as late as by 1990. Since 1998, figures for suspected infringements are merely 
given by member state, unlike in previous years, where they were also provided 
by policy sector. Established infringements, finally, are jointly reported by 
policy sector and member states only in the 10
th Annual Report for the years 
1988 till 1992 (Commission of the European Communities 1993: 165 ff.). And 
in 1992, the Commission also stopped reporting Court Judgements. Since 1999, 
finally, cases in which Directives are not transposed in time, are no longer an 
integral part of the raw data. They are still individually listed but with one major 
information missing – the stage of the proceedings they reached. 
 
Second, and more importantly, the reported data show some 
inconsistencies. For any given year, the Annual Reports of the Commission 
provide two types of data. Aggregate data summarize the number of 
infringement proceedings classified by the different stages, member states, 
policy sectors, and type of infringements. The “raw” data list the individual 
infringement cases, which are to make up the aggregate data. A research team at 
the European University Institute entered all the individual cases into a database 
(see below), which allows for a comparison of the aggregate and the raw data 
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revealing some serious “mismatches”. The raw data only comprise about one 
third of the letters actually sent since letters are only individually listed if they 
refer to cases of non-transposition of Directives.
7 The aggregate data for 
Reasoned Opinions and Court Referrals does not equal the sum of the 
individually listed cases either. The aggregate data report 5762 Reasoned 
Opinions sent by the Commission between 1978 and 1999. But the 17 Annual 
Reports list only 4241 individual Reasoned Opinions for these years; some 
26,4% of the cases are missing. The same inconsistencies can be found for ECJ 
Referrals, where about 37,9% of the cases are not listed (1593 to 990). The 
explanation for the poor goodness of fit between aggregate and raw data lies in 
the reporting methods: Unlike in the aggregate data, only those cases are 
included in the raw data that are still open at the end of the year reported. If the 
Commission had sent a Reasoned Opinion in January and the case is closed in 
July because the member state rectified the violation, the case features in the 
aggregate but not in the raw data. In 1999, for example, 122 out of 438 cases, in 
which the Commission had sent a Reasoned Opinion, were closed or merged 




While the (changing) reporting methods of the Commission may render 
cross-time comparisons more difficult, the ranking of the member states with 
respect to their non-compliance records does not change significantly within the 
two different data sets (see table 1). Spain and Portugal are the only exceptions. 
Their relative performance in the category of ECJ Referrals looks better in the 
raw than in the aggregate data because both countries take great pains in 
avoiding that cases enter the judicial stage of the infringement proceedings.
9 
 
While the Commissions seems to report all cases in which it initiated 
proceedings, it could still refrain from opening proceedings in the first place, 
and moving from one stage to next, respectively. The Commission has 
considerable discretion in deciding whether and when to open proceedings and 
to move from one stage to the next one (Evans 1979; Audretsch 1986). In 
principle, the Commission prefers quiet negotiations and bargaining to formal 
sanctions in order to induce compliance (Snyder 1993). It considers an official 
opening of Article 226 proceedings only “when all other means have failed” 
(Commission of the European Communities 1991: 205). The great majority of 
cases are indeed settled in bilateral exchanges with national authorities during 
the administrative stage – only one third of the letters result into Reasoned 
Opinions and, hence, become official. The sending of a Formal Letter is already 
preceded by written exchanges and meetings between the Commission and the 
member state on an informal level. The political discretion of the Commission in 
deciding whether and when to open official proceedings can cause a 
voluntaristic bias in the sample. This might be all the more true since the Article 
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130r(4) of the Treaty attributes the primary responsibility for implementing EU 
policies to the member states. It has been argued that the principle of 
decentralized enforcement of Community Law leaves the Commission, which 
does not enjoy any direct political legitimation, in a weak and “invidious 
position” (Williams 1994). Thus, the Commission may treat some member states 
more carefully than others because they are more powerful, e.g. make significant 
contributions to the EU budget or dispose of considerable voting power in the 
Council. Or their population is very “Eurosceptic” and the Commission is 
carefully avoiding to upset the public opinion in these member states by 
officially shaming them for non-compliance with Community Law (Jordan 
1999).  
 
Yet, the relative ranking of the member states in the different proceedings 
does not reveal such biases. (table 2). Germany and France, the two member 
states which contribute most to the EU budget and possess considerable 
bargaining power in the Council, figure prominently in the higher stages of the 
proceedings.
10 So does France, which belongs to the “big three”, too, and has 
been one of the driving forces of European integration, together with Germany. 
In Denmark and the UK, public and elite support for European institutions is 
among the lowest in all member states, only topped by Austria and Sweden, 
which recently joined the European Union.
11 Denmark does indeed perform best 
across all stages. The British record, however, is more mixed. 
 
TABLE 2: RANKING OF MEMBER STATES AT THE STAGES OF  






ECJ Referrals ECJ 
Judgements 
Italy Italy Italy Italy 
Greece Greece Belgium  Belgium 
Portugal Portugal    Greece  Greece 
France France France Germany 
Spain Belgium  Germany  France 
Belgium Spain  Lux  Spain 
Germany Germany Spain  Netherlands 
Ireland Ireland Ireland Ireland 
UK Lux Portugal  Lux 
Lux UK Neatherlands  UK 
Netherlands Netherlands UK  Denmark 
Denmark Denmark Denmark Portugal 
Source: see table 4. 
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In sum, the Commission data on member state infringements of Community 
Law suffer from some problems, which should caution us against their use as 
straight forward indicators of non-compliance with Community Law. At the 
same time, the Commission data are the only statistical source available. There 
is no international organization or even national state, which provides such com-
prehensive information on issues of non-compliance. The Infringement database 
compiled by the European University Institute comprises some 4.500 
infringement cases, which the Commission officially initiated in the last 30 
years. Since the Commission does not fully report Formal Letters, the database 
only contains the individually listed cases of Reasoned Opinions and subsequent 
stages. The cases are classified by infringement number, member state, policy 
sector, legal basis (celex number), legal act, type of infringement, and 
subsequent measures taken by the Commission. The database is organized into 
two different datasets. The first dataset reports a case by all the stages it went 
through after a Reasoned Opinion was issued. Thus, we are able to trace its 
“history”. The second dataset includes each case by the highest stage it reached 
before termination or withdrawal. Unlike the aggregate data in the Annual 
Reports, each case is only counted once and not several times as a letter, 
Reasoned Opinion, ECJ Referral etc. These data can serve as an important 
indicator for relative non-compliance as long as we carefully control for 
potential selection biases. 
 
 
Non-Compliance with Community Law – A Statistical Artifact 
 
For the last 10 years, the European Commission has been denouncing a growing 
compliance deficit, which it believes to threaten both the effectiveness and the 
legitimacy of European policy-making (Commission of the European 
Communities 1990, 1993, 1999). While some scholars argue that the level of 
compliance with Community Law compares well to the level of compliance 
with domestic law in democratic liberal states (Keohane and Hoffmann 1990: 
278; Neyer, Wolf and Zürn 1999), many consider EU-member state non-
compliance as a serious problem that is systemic and pathological (Krislov, 
Ehlermann and Weiler 1986; Weiler 1988; cf. Ludlow 1991; Snyder 1993; From 
and Stava 1993; Mendrinou 1996; Tallberg 1999). 
 
The negative assessments are based on the increasing numbers of Formal 
Letters, Reasoned Opinions, and ECJ Referrals the member states have been 
facing over the last 30 years. By contrast, I demonstrate in the next section that 
the level of non-compliance has remained rather stable. 
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Revisiting the Evidence on Member State Non-Compliance with Community Law 
 
1) Suspected Infringements 
Given the inconsistencies in the reported data (see above), we cannot 
compare the evolution of complaints, the Commission’s own initiatives, 
parliamentary question etc. over time. Suspected infringements are no reliable 
indicator for non-compliance. 
 
2) Transposition Rates 
Since 1990, the Commission reports the Directives implemented by the 
member states as percentage of the Directives to be implemented. The 
transposition rate is an indicator for the timely incorporation of Directives into 
national law. Not only has average transposition always been high (above 90%). 
It has improved over the years, from an average of 91% in 1990 to an average of 
95% in 1999 (chart 1).  
 
 












1990  1991  1992  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997  1998  1999
 
 
Particularly the “laggards” – Italy, Portugal, and Greece – which ranged 
well below the Community average in 1990, made significant progress catching 
up with the other member states since the mid 1990s (table 3). The range 
between member states decreased from 20% in 1991 to 5% in 1999. The upward 
trend is even more remarkable if we consider that the number of Directives to be 
implemented has grown by 70%, from 885 in 1990 to 1505 in 1999. If one can 
speak of transposition problems at all, they relate to issues of timing – member 
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states often need longer than the time provided by the Directives (usually two 
years) to incorporate them into national law. 
 
TABLE 3: TRANSPOSITION RATES BY MEMBER STATE, 1990-99 
 Belg.  Denm.  FRG  Greece  Spain  France  Eire  Italy  Lux  NL  Port.  UK  EU 
1990 92% 97% 95% 85% 94% 94% 91% 82% 90% 93% 84% 95% 91% 
1991 88% 97% 93% 90% 92% 95% 89% 77% 87% 90% 86% 95% 90% 
1992 91% 96% 90% 88% 90% 93% 91% 89% 88% 93% 89% 93% 91% 
1993 91% 95% 89% 88% 90% 90% 89% 89% 91% 92% 89% 92% 90% 
1994 90% 98% 91% 87% 91% 92% 92% 88% 94% 94% 97% 89% 92% 
1995 90% 98% 93% 90% 93% 93% 93% 89% 93% 97% 90% 96% 93% 
1996 93% 98% 94% 91% 95% 92% 93% 90% 94% 97% 92% 94% 94% 
1997 92% 97% 94% 93% 95% 94% 94% 93% 94% 96% 94% 94% 94% 
1998 95% 98% 97% 94% 97% 94% 96% 94% 94% 97% 95% 96% 96% 
1999 95% 97% 95% 92% 96% 94% 94% 94% 93% 96% 93% 95% 95% 
Source: Annual Reports 1990-99. 
 
3) Established Infringements 
The total numbers have significantly increased for all stages of the 
infringement proceedings. While the Commission had opened 227 proceedings 
in 1980, the numbers more than quadrupled in 1990 (964). They peaked in 1997 
with 1461 and have hovered around 1100 ever since (chart 2). The same trends 
can be observed for the Reasoned Opinions and the ECJ Referrals.  
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1996 reform of infringement proceedings 
 
 




Chart 3: Total Number of Infringement Proceedings Opened in Relation to Violative Opportunities for  
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1996 reform of 
infringement proceedings
First Annual Report 
published 
      average  (9,4) 
 
 
But these numbers contain several statistical artifacts. First, the Commission 
adopted a more rigorous approach to member state non-compliance in the late 
1970s (Mendrinou 1996: 3). Likewise, the Commission and the ECJ pursued a 
more aggressive policy of enforcement in the early 1990s in order to ensure the 
effective implementation of the Internal Market programme (Tallberg 1999). 
Not surprisingly, the numbers of opened infringement proceedings increased 
dramatically twice, in 1983/84 by 57% and again in 1991/92 by 40%. Second, 
the Southern enlargement in the first half of the 1980s (Greece, 1981, Spain and 
Portugal, 1986) led to a significant increase in infringement proceedings opened 
once the “period of grace”, which the Commission grants new member states, 
had expired. From 1989 to 1990, the number of opened proceedings grew by 
40% (223 cases), for which Spain, Portugal, and Greece hold exclusive 
responsibility. The three countries account for 249 new cases while the numbers 
for the other member states remained more or less stable. The last significant 
increase of 28% in 1996/97 is not so much caused by the Northern enlargement 
(Sweden, Austria, Finland 1995). In 1996, the internal reform of the 
infringement proceedings re-stated the “intended meaning” (sense véritable) of 
the formal letters as mere “requests for observations” (demande d’observation) 
rather than warnings of the Commission.
13 Avoiding any accusations, letters 
should be issued more rapidly than before. And indeed, the number of letters 
sent increased significantly after the reform had been implemented. Third, 
infringement numbers as such, even compared across years, do not say much 
about changes in the level of non-compliance. They have to be measured against 
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the numbers of legal act that can be potentially infringed as well as the number 
of member states that can potentially infringe them. The number of legal acts in 
force has more than doubled since 1983 (from 4566 to 9767)
14 and five more 
member states have joined since then. If we calculate the number of 
infringement proceedings opened as a percentage of “violative opportunities”
15 
(number of legal acts in force times member states) for each year, the level of 
non-compliance has not increased (chart 3). 
 
It should be clear by now, that the data published by the Commission in 
its Annual Reports do not support any of the claims about rising compliance 
problems in the EU. First, the level of non-compliance has decreased rather than 
increased if we control for the growing number of violative opportunities as well 
as for changes in the enforcement strategy of the Commission. Second, the level 
of non-compliance in the EU hardly indicates a compliance problem, systemic 
or otherwise. Each social or political system faces instances of norm violation. 
Rather than merely counting cases of non-compliance, we therefore have to 
determine a threshold after which the observed level of non-compliance is 
considered as a serious problem for a community. This study measures 
infringements of Community Law in relation to violative opportunities, which 
assumes that each rule can only be violated once per year per member state. In 
1998, for instance, the Commission opened around 1.100 infringement 
proceedings. Compared to a minimum of 146.500 violative opportunities, are 
these figures really an indicator for compliance problems? The actual level of 
non-compliance is probably much higher than indicated by the 1.100 
infringement proceedings opened. So are is number of violative opportunities. 
This is precisely the reason why I argue that the official infringement data do not 
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On Leaders and Laggards in the European Union 
 
While the overall level of non-compliance does not appear to be excessive and 
has remained rather stable, it varies significantly between member states (table 
4).  
 
TABLE 4: LEADERS AND LAGGARDS OF COMPLIANCE WITH COMMUNITY LAW 











Italy   11,6%   16,0%   22,2%   30,4%   24,6% 
Greece   11,3%   12,7%   13,7%   12,8%   11,7% 
Portugal   10,8%   11,1%   12,7%    0%*    1,7% 
France   10,3%   11,1%   12,3%    7,5%    8,7% 
Belgium    8,4%   10,0%    7,5%   15,9%   18,3% 
Spain    10,1%   8,1%   6,8%   6,6%   8,7% 
Germany   7,8%   7,8%   6,1%    10,6%    10,0% 
Ireland   6,6%   6,4%   6,1%   3,9%   4,6% 
Lux   6,2%   6,3%   5,0%   3,5%   3,8% 
UK   6,6%   4,5%   3,5%   2,7%   2,9% 
NL   5,9%   4,4%   2,8%   3,9%   3,3% 
Denmark   4,5%   1,6%   1,3%   2,2%   1,7% 
EU  Average   8,3%   8,3%   8,3%   8,3%   8,3% 
Source: Column 2-4 aggregate data of the Annual Reports, column 5 EUI database on member state compliance 
with Community Law (www.iue.it/rsc/rsc_tools), column 6 data from the Annual Reports.
16 
* There are no ECJ Judgements for Portugal listed in the Annual Reports whereas we find 6 cases of delayed 
non-compliance with ECJ Judgements; aggregate data on ECJ Judgements are only available from 1978-92. 
 
At the opening stage, which is still unofficial, the difference between member 
states is rather modest and ranges between 4,5% (Denmark) and 11,6% (Italy). 
In the subsequent, official stages, however, the initial range of 7,1% starts to 
widen. It doubles for the Reasoned Opinions (14,4%), climbs another 6,5% to 
20,9% for ECJ Referrals and reaches a maximum of 30,4% for ECJ Judgements. 
However, leaving a side Italy as an extreme outlier, the variance becomes less 
pronounced (chart 3). It begins with a 5,4% for Letters and progressively rises to 
a 8,3% for Reasoned Opinions, a 10,9% for ECJ Referrals and a 13,7% for ECJ 
Judgements, to culminate in a 15,4% for Delayed Compliance with ECJ 
Judgements. 
 































The majority of the member states show a relatively “decent” level of 
non-compliance. Five countries – Denmark, the Netherlands, the UK, 
Luxembourg, and Ireland – remain well below the Community average of 
infringements while Spain and Germany oscillate around it. The only member 
states that show a consistent pattern of non-compliance are Italy, France, 
Belgium and Greece. Portugal’s initial performance is also rather poor but 
improves significantly when entering the judicial stage. The same applies to 
France, which remains, however, among the “top laggards”. The group is led by 
Italy, whose non-compliance record almost makes it a class of its own! Italy is 
followed by Greece, whose records remain consistently bad, and Belgium, 
whose performance even deteriorates with each stage. The share of Italy, France, 
Belgium and Greece in the different infringement stages starts with a modest 
37,8% of the Letters but then progressively rises to 49,8% of the Reasoned 
Opinions and 55,7% of the ECJ Referrals, only to reach 66,6% of the ECJ 
Judgements and 63,6% of the cases of delayed compliance with ECJ Judgements 
 
 





Despite the widely held assumption, which is equally shared by European 
policy-makers and students of European integration, we have little evidence that 
the European Union suffers from a serious compliance deficit. While the size of 
a deficit may largely depend on the normative standpoint of the observer and the 
criteria used (Hill 1997), there is simply no statistical data that would allow us to 
assess whether the member states systematically violate Community Law. The 
statistics published by the Commission in its Annual Reports provide only 
indicators for relative changes in non-compliance across time, member states, or 
policy sectors. If we control for changes in the Commission’s enforcement 
strategy, on the one hand, and the rising number of legislation to be complied 
with as well as of member states that have to comply, on the other hand, the 
level of non-compliance has not significantly decreased over time. 
 
If we wish to the take the infringement data as an indicator for a 
compliance deficit in the EU at all, the problem is focused on only four member 
states among which Italy is the lonely leader. Interestingly enough, the four 
laggards do not conform to the conventional wisdom, which perceives non-
compliance as a predominantly “Southern problem” (for a critical review of the 
literature see Börzel 2000). Only two – Italy and Greece – qualify as parts of 
Southern Europe. The other two southern member states, Portual and Spain, 
show no symptomes of the so called “Mediterranean Syndrome” (La Spina and 
Sciortino 1993), which allegedly renders southern European countries incapable 
of effectively implementing European Law. Nor do the four laggards fit any of 
the other common explanation for non-compliance and ineffective 
implementation since they differ in almost any respect that is considered to be 
relevant in the compliance literature (cf. Börzel forthcoming). For example, 
while Italy and Greece have a reputation for administrative lethargy and 
clientelism, France has often served as an example for a professional and 
effective bureaucracy. The Italian and Belgian regions hold strong 
responsibilities in the implementation of EU Law. France and Greece, by 
contrast, are unitary states where subnational authorities only play a subordinate 
role. Moreover, the three other federal states in the EU, Germany, Spain, and 
Austria, score much lower on non-compliance. Likewise, Greece is one of the 
poorest member states whereas Italy and France belong to the largest economies 
in Europe – together with Germany and the UK, which have a much better 
compliance record. The non-compliance patterns in the European Union do not 
lend themselves to an easy explanation. Joseph Weiler’s statement of almost 10 
years ago, that our knowledge concerning member state compliance with 
Community Law resembles a “black hole” (Weiler 1991: 2463) remains largely 
unchallenged. Despite a rich body of implementation studies, there is little 
systematic, theory-guided research able to generate generalizable explanations 
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of (non)compliance. Earlier works provided, albeit sophisticated, documentation 
rather than explanation of compliance failure (e.g. Azzi 1985; Krislov, 
Ehlermann and Weiler 1986; Siedentopf and Hauschild 1988; Bennett 1991). 
More recent implementation studies have become more ambitious and strive to 
develop theoretical models of compliance. But they often suffer the problem of 
too many variables and too few cases; they focus on the implementation of one 
or two sectoral policies, frequently in the area of environment and social policy, 
in three or four countries, usually including Great Britain, France, and Germany 
(e.g. Héritier, Knill and Mingers 1996; Knill 1998; Duina 1999; Börzel 2000). 
The more than 4.500 cases of member state infringements of Community Law 
individually listed in the Annual Reports and compiled in a database of the 
European University Institute provide the very first opportunity to 
systematically test competing explanations of non-compliance in a quantitative 
study. The data still do not allow to draw inferences about the actual level of 
non-compliance in the European Union. But they provide a random sample of 
the official infringement cases. And it is the only data we have. 
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1  Treaty Provisions and Regulations are generally binding and directly applicable, while 
Decisions are administrative acts aimed at specific individuals, companies, or governments 
for which they are binding. 
2   ECJ Fédéchar v. High Authority, C-8/55; ECJ Van Gend en Loos, C-26/62. 
3   But note that, according to the view of the ECJ, the letter defines the object at issue in any 
subsequent court proceedings. As a result, the Commission is not allowed to include 
additional points during subsequent stages, even she later discovers new infringements. 
4   The basic amount of the fine is multiplied by a factor n, taking into account the GDP of a 
member state and its number of votes in the Council. The “n” for Luxembourg, for instance, is 
1 and for Germany 26,4 (OJ C 63, 28.2.1997). 
5   Only Denmark, Finland, and Sweden regularly report to the Commissions the measures 
taken to transpose EU Diretives into national law (Jordan 1999: 80). 
6  In order to compare states, which differ in their years of membership, I “standardized” 
their scores. First I divided the number of complaints, letters etc. of the different member 
states by their years of membership. Second, I added up these average scores and made the 
sum equal 100%. Finally, I calculated the percentage of the average scores. 
7   The reports do list a few hundred other Letters because, for political reasons, the 
Commission sometimes decides to make a Letter public. Moreover, some Directorate 
Generals are less faithful to the Commission’s policy of not disclosing cases of improper 
incorporation and application. 
8   Interview in the enforcement unit of the Secretariat General of the Commission, Brussels, 
26.4.2001. 
9   Interviews in the enforcement unit of the Secretariat General and the Legal Service of the 
Commission, Brussels, 25./26.4.2001. 
10    In the 1990s, Germany provided 28,2% and France 17,5% of the EU budget 
(Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, January 2000, unpublished document). 
11  See “Initial Results of Eurobarometer Survey No. 54 (autumn 2000)”, Brussels: European 
Union, 8 February 2001. 
12  Finland, Austria, and Sweden are excluded because they joined the EU only in 1995. They 
are still in the adaptation phase and the incorporation of the comprehensive acquis 
communautaire into national law is not fully concluded. Most of their infringement cases 
refer to the delayed transposition of Directives. Therefore, their infringement records may be 
above-average in the earlier stages. 
13  Internal document of the Commission, unpublished. 
14  I am thankful to Wolfgang Wessels and Andreas Maurer for providing me with the annual 
numbers of legislation in force. 
15  I owe this term to Beth Simmons. 
16  I am thankful to Lisa Conant for providing me with the data. 
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